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ENTRY INTO FORCE OF TRANSACTIONAL PRIVATE
LAW TREATIES AFFECTING AVIATION: CASE STUDY PROPOSED UNIDROIT/ICAO CONVENTION AS
APPLIED TO AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT
LORNE CLARK AND JEFFREY WOOL*

A

DIPLOMATIC conference will be held from October 29th
to November 16th of this year for the adoption of the proposed UNIDROIT/ICAO Convention on International Interests
(Convention)' as applied to aircraft equipment by virtue of a
protocol thereto (Protocol).2
This brief article will address the broad contours of the key
issue for that conference: i.e. under what conditions will the
Convention/Protocol come into force.
The matter is being addressed for two reasons. First, its resolution is of utmost practical and economic importance. Second,
it has previously been discussed in abstract terms, without a
proper analytic framework, including an agreed system of treaty
taxonomy and associated lexicon.
As the Convention/Protocol,jointly sponsored by the Interna3
tional Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)
* Mr. Clark is Vice President,Legal Affairs and Corporate Secretary, InternationalAir
Transport Association. Mr. Wool is Group Secretary and General Counsel, Aviation
Working Group, and Partner,Perkins Coie, LLP. The views expressed herein are those of
Messrs. Clark and Wool, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of IATA, AWG or their
respective members. The authors wish to thank Franfoise Brito, Perkins Coie, LLP, for her
assistance in preparing this article.

1 See Convention Relating to InternationalInterests in Mobile Equipment, at Attachment D, pt. I, ICAO Doc. 9765-LC/191 (June 4, 2001) (Report of the 31st Session
of the Legal Committee).
2 See id. at Attachment E, pt. I.
3 The UNIDROIT was charted under the League of Nations in 1926 and was
reconstituted after World War II. The UNIDROIT Convention examines ways of
harmonizing and coordinating the private laws of States and groups of States. See
Statute of UNIDROIT, Nov. 26, 1991, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. 2494, T.I.A.S. No. 5743
(official translation approved by its General Assembly).
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and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) ,4 conjures private versus public law concepts and air law versus nonair law practices, they make for an interesting, broader case
study. How should entry into force questions be viewed in the
context of a transactionalprivate law treaty affecting aviation?
Our basic conclusion is that the Convention/Protocol should
enter into force when a small number of States have ratified
these instruments. A corollary is that all stakeholders in the
treaty finalization process should, at this stage, be making robust
efforts to ensure that there are no practical impediments to
achieving that objective.
This article is organized as follows: Part I will set out basic
principles, including those relating to treaty law generally, treaty
taxonomy, and the proper classification of the Convention/Protocol. Part II will outline the six principal arguments in favor of
prompt entry into force. Part III will outline, then counter and/
or annotate, three arguments in favor of more protracted entry
into force. Part IV will set out the realistic options on entry into
force, which may assist interested parties in their planning for
the diplomatic conference.
PART I: BASIC PRINCIPLES
A.

TREAT', LAW GENERALLY

In line with the treaty-as-contract mode 5 embodied in the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Treaty
Convention),6 a treaty enters into force in the manner and on
the dates provided for in the treaty or as the negotiating States
may agree.7
This basic rule has two qualifications of potential relevance in
the instant case. First, select provisions that, by their nature, relate to entry into force or actions prior thereto, apply as of diplomatic adoption of the text."
4 ICAO was formed by virtue of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. ICAO is charged with ensuring the "safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation." See id. at art.
44(a).
5 The principle of pacta sunt servandais foundational to the theory and practice
of international treaty-making and is recognized in the Vienna Treaty Convention, infra note 6, at Third Recital.
6 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
7 Id. at art. 24(1).
8 Id. at art. 24(4).
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Second, a treaty or parts of it may be "applied provisionally
pending its entry into force" if the treaty so provides or the negotiating States otherwise agree (Provisional Application).'
However, unless otherwise agreed in the treaty or by such States,
that provisional application is easily terminable by a State. It
must simply notify the relevant States (those agreeing to such
Provisional Application) of its intention not to become a party
to the treaty.10
B.

TREATy TAXONOMY

As a general proposition, the law applicable to the entry into
force of treaties does not differentiate between treaty types. Yet
treaty practice with respect to entry into force differs, often materially, based on the treaty's characteristics, the objectives of the
relevant states, the customary practices of its sponsors, and the
personal experiences of those involved.
Threshold questions in addressing entry into force issues are
thus often taxonomic: how are treaties classified, at least for entry into force purposes? Unfortunately, there is neither a universal classification system nor an accepted lexicon, which may
be called upon to reach a summary conclusion.
Broad distinctions are often made between public international
treaties and private internationaltreaties. The latter might be succinctly defined as treaties addressing relations among private
parties (persons and businesses); the former, as addressing relations among states or between states and private parties. These
definitions, while setting baselines, admittedly lack nuance:
many, if not most, treaties have both private and public law
elements.
A sub-distinction, within the broader category of private international law, and one that has not yet gained popular currency,
is centered on the nature of the private activity. Is the private
action transactional, that is, does it address planned and patterned commercial dealings (e.g., extensions of credit, sale transactions, etc.)? In contrast, is the private action nontransactional, involving acts that are unforeseen, if not unforeseeable (e.g., tortious acts)? We suggest denoting the former
9 Id. at art. 25 (1). See generally Ren6 Lefeber, The ProvisionalApplication of Treaties, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (Jan Klabbers and Rend Lefeber, eds.,

1998).
10 See Vienna Treaty Convention, supra note 6, at art. 25(2).
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"TRANSACTIONAL

PRIVATE LAw TREATIES,"

and will henceforth

employ that expression.
Second, distinctions might be made between air law treaties
and other treaties. Air law treaties have aviation as their principal subject. A controversial question is whether this is exhaustive. Do treaties that merely, inter alia, impact or affect aviation
constitute air law treaties? While there is much to say on this
matter, particularly in the context of economic regulation, we
will leave that for a later occasion.
Its limited relevance, for the topic at hand, relates to the role
and practices of the ICAO, the United Nations body with exclusive competence in matters of air law.
C.

CLASSIFICATION OF CONVENTION/PROTOCOL

The Convention/Protocol is centered on facilitating certain
transaction types, the secured financing and leasing of aircraft
and of aircraft equipment." Indeed, the sole reason it has attracted aviation industry support is its baseline objective of increasing the availability and reducing the costs of aviation credit
12
through advanced, structured financing practices.
The principal features of the Convention/Protocol are classical, indeed prototypical, private law matters: the establishment
of criteria for creating a sui generisproprietary interest in aircraft
equipment, 13 the setting of rules for the enforcement of that
interest between the transaction parties inter se, 14 and the rank15
ing of conflicting proprietary interests in aircraft equipment.
The first two aspects, creation and enforcement, affect two private parties. The third, ranking, affects the private parties with
competing interests.

1 See generally Roy Goode,

Transcending the Boundaries of Earth and Space: The

PreliminaryDraft UNIDROIT Convention on InternationalInterests in Mobile Equipment,

1 UNIFORM LAw REVIEw 52, 62-68 (1998), and G. Lauzon, Report of the Rapporteur
on InternationalInterests in Mobile Equipment (Aircraft Equipment), LC/31-WP/3-4 at
9-19.
12 See Jeffrey Wool,

The Case for a

Commercial Orientation to the Proposed

UNIDROIT Convention as applied to Aircraft Equipment, 31 LAW & POL. IN INT'L Bus.

79, 81-83 (1999).
13 See Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 2(2) (types of interests), 2(3)(a) (interests in aircraft equipment), and 6 (creation criteria).
14 See id. at arts. 7 -14 (general remedies); see also, Protocol, supra note 2, at
arts. IX-XIII (modifications applicable to aircraft equipment).
15 See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 28 (general priority rules); see also, Protocol, supra note 2, at art. XIV (modifications applicable to aircraft equipment).
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Thus, the Convention/Protocol is fundamentally a transactional private law treaty. This point is worth emphasizing since
select provisions in the text ancillary to its core purposes touch
upon matters that give rise to mischaracterization of the instruments as a whole. First, the Convention/Protocol will create a
new electronic international registry, the sole purpose of which
will be to establish a first-in-time priority rule for ranking interests (International Registry).16 While it is proposed that it be
governed by an intergovernmental "supervisory authority," the
latter's functions are circumscribed by the limited purpose of
the International Registry.' 7 The Convention/Protocol will also
set out jurisdictional rules relating to dispute resolution among
private parties in a transactional context (not for aggrieved
states as a matter of public law)."'

A sophisticated analysis of the Convention/Protocol's International Registry and jurisdictional provisions lead to the conclusion that they support the private law treaty characterization.
From a broader perspective, the inclusion of these supporting
functional features is part of an emerging trend in transactional
private law treaties. These instruments increasingly seek to address the practicalities of their covered transactions, even if doing so widens their scope.'"
Whether the Convention/Protocol is an air law instrument is
subject to legitimate debate. We do not express a view on the
point since the question lacks practical import, at least for the
moment. The diplomatic conference for its adoption will be cosponsored by UNIDROIT and ICAO.
In sum, a synthetic characterization of the Convention/Protocol is that of a Transactional Private Law Treaty affecting aviation. The foregoing description does not, of course, qualify
aspects of the Convention that apply to non-aircraft equipment

16 See Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 1(cc) (definition of "registered interest"), 15 (establishment of International Registry), and 28 (priority rules).
17 See id. at art. 16(2) (i) (residual "do all things necessary power," emphasizing
the need to ensure that an "efficient notice-based electronic registration exists").
is See id. at arts. 41-43 (general jurisdictional provisions); see also, Protocol,
supra note 2, at art. XX (additional bases applicable to aircraft equipment).

19 See e.g., United Nations Convention on Independent Guaranteesand Stand-by Letters

of Credit, G.A. Res. 50/48, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at art. 20, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
50/48 (1995) (addressing provisional court measures in the context of banking
transactions) [hereinafter Banking Convention].
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via other protocols, 20 the development of which are well
underway.2
PART II: PROMPT ENTRY INTO FORCE: THE ARGUMENTS
For completeness, six principal arguments supporting provisions in the Convention/Protocol designed to expedite its
prompt entry into force are listed and briefly discussed. In our
view, each argument, argument A (Economic Argument), argument B (Horizontal Equity), argument C (Enhanced Safety),
and argument F (Paradigmatic Argument), is dispositive, itself
justifying such provisions. In addition, we believe that argument
D (Precedents) and argument E (New Initiative) are sound.
A.

THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT

The economic justification for prompt entry into force is simple and compelling. Independent economic studies2 2 have concluded that the macro- and micro- economic benefits of the
Convention/Protocol are significant 23 and will be widely shared
among states, airlines, manufacturers, financiers, and the traveling public. 4
These benefits start accruing only when the Convention/Protocol is in effect. The longer the waiting period prior to entry
into force, the less the aggregate benefit. Sometimes cliches really do make the point: in this context, "time is money".
20 See Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 2(3) (b), (c) (Convention applies to
railway rolling stock and space property when a protocol therefor is in effect) and
47(a)-(c) (controlling nature of the protocols).
21 Intergovernmental analysis of both the railway rolling stock and the space
protocols have commenced. In the former case, UNIDROIT is cooperating with

the Intergovernmental Organization for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF). A

jointly sponsored intergovernmental meeting was held in March 2001. In the
latter case, UNIDROIT is cooperating with the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs' Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPOUS). That committee first studied the current text in April 2001.
22 See A. Saunders & Ingo Walter, Proposed UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment as applicable to Aircraft Equipment through the Aircraft Equipment Protocol: Economic Impact Assessment, 23 AIR & SPACE L. 339 (1998)

[hereinafter Economic Impact Assessment]. This study, prepared by leading applied economists, was undertaken under the auspices of the Institut Europ~en
d'Administration des Affaires (INSEAD) and the Salomon Center of New York
University.
23 The Economic Impact Assessment states that "[ol]n conservative assumptions," the Convention/Protocol will produce economic gains "estimated at several billion U.S. dollars on an annual basis." See id. at 343.
24 See id. at 343-44.
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Transactional Private Law Treaties that seek to produce economic benefits should seek to maximize such benefits. The assertion - which has been made - that a larger number of
ratifications will produce greater aggregate economic benefits
misses the temporal aspect of the calculation. That is evident in
the most rudimentary of economic models.

B.

THE HORIZONTAL

EQUITY

ARGUMENT

A subtler, yet equally compelling, economic-related argument
considers the comparative impact of entry intoforce timing on different
states. From an equitable perspective, this argument trenchantly
differentiates the entry into force implications of Transactional
Private Law Treaties from that of other treaties.
Airlines in different states need and acquire aircraft equipment at different points in times. In many cases, delivery schedules are known or are reasonably predictable. 25 By way of
example, -an airline in State 1 (51) may take delivery next year,
airlines in State 2 (S2) the following years, and airlines in State 3
(S3) three years from now, and so on. Some airlines take delivery of a large percentage of their required aircraft within a relatively short window of time. Aircraft equipment usually has a
long life. 26 As a result, some states whose airlines take deliveries
at one point in time may not take additional deliveries for a significant period thereafter.
The foregoing points lead to this unassailable conclusion: on
a comparative basis, the costs in lost benefits of protracted entry
into force are wholly allocated to states and airlines that take
delivery of aircraft during the waiting period. These states are
often known and identifiable. In other words, entry into force
provisions, in this specific context, produces winners and losers,
known ex ante.
Thus, the difficult question: why should some states (S3) benefit from the Convention/Protocol, while others (SI) do not,
simply on the basis of their respective delivery schedules? More
to the point, why should a Ratifying Transactional State's (and
25 While specific delivery information is confidential, related data is available
from a variety of commercial database services.
26 A reasonable estimate of the average life of an aircraft in air travel service is
approximately 25 years. Many aircraft are then converted to freight transport for

an additional period of time. See generally Airbus Global Market Forecast 2000 -2019
1, 21 (July 2000), available at http://www.2airbus.com/pdfs/media/GMF2000.
pdf; see also Boeing's Current Market Outlook 2001 32, available at http://
www.boeing.com/commercial/cmo/index.html.
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its airlines') ability to benefit from the treaty be wholly dependent on ratification by third states - that may have no deliveries
scheduled for a comfortable period of time?
Prompt entry into force provisions ensure horizontal equity
among states and their airlines, and do not pass the costs, on a
comparative basis, of any delays to an identifiable group of states
and airlines. Simply stated, the shorter the entry into force waiting period, the fairer the process.
C.

THE ENHANCED SAFETY ARGUMENT

Access to financing, particularly for the States and airlines
most in need, will assist in the acquisition of newer aircraft
equipment. This will enhance aviation safety, the most fundamental objective of all actors in the air transport sector, including air transport policymakers.
Accordingly, prompt entry into force of the Convention/Protocol should be supported on general aviation policy grounds.
D.

THE PRECEDENT ARGUMENT

The weight of precedent in the context of Transactional Private Law Treaties solidly supports minimum ratification requirements, specifically designed to expedite their entry into force.
If one objectively considers such requirements, particularly
the instruments sponsored by the leading intergovernmental
bodies in this field, 7 the following conclusions will be drawn.
First, there is a trend, discernable in recently adopted treaties,
requiring a very small number of ratifications, between two and
five.28
27 Joining UNIDROIT, the two other leading non-regional international organizations in this field are the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law [hereinafter UNCITRAL] and the Hague Conference Private International
Law [hereinafter Hague Conference]. Established in 1966, the UNCITRAL actively examines ways of reducing or remedying obstacles to international trade.
See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 2205, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). First convened in
1893 by the government of the Netherlands, the Hague Conference became a
permanent intergovernmental organization with the entry into force of its statute
on July 15, 1955. Its mission is to bring about the progressive unification of the
rules of private international law. See Statute of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, entered into force July 15, 1955, at art. 1, available at http://
wwwhcch.net/e/conventions/text0le.html (English translation of the statute).
28 The three most recent elaborated Transactional Private Law Treaties, as well
as, the one currently in its final stage of development, require between two and
five ratifications. See UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing,
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Second, the mean number of ratifications required is approximately five.29
Third, the largest number is ten ratifications.30
Fourth, it is not unusual for a large number of States to subsequently ratify a treaty that came into force with a small number
of initial ratifications."' There is no necessary connection between entry into force requirements and the quantum of ultimate ratifications. International legal instruments attract
support based on merit, not initial ratification requirements.

opened for signature May 28, 1988, art. 16(1), reprinted in 27 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 931 (1988) [hereinafter Financial Leasing Convention] (three ratifications);
UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring, opened for signature May
28, 1988, art. 14(1), reprintedin 27 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 943 (1988) (three ratifications), Inter-American Convention on the Law applicable to International
Contracts, opened for signature Mar. 17, 1994, reprinted in 33 INT'L LEGAL MATERLkS 732 (1994); General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, T.S.
No. 78, art. 28 (two ratifications); Draft UNCITRAL Convention on Receivables,
33rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/466 (1999), United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Report of the Working Group on InternationalContract Practices,

U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., at Annex 1, art. 43, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/466 (1999). (five
ratifications).
29 See e.g., Banking Convention, supra note 19, at art. 28(1) (five ratifications);
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (1986), opened for signature Dec. 22, 1986, art. 27(1), 24 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1573 (1985) (five ratifications); Convention Relating to a Uniform
Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened
for signature July 1, 1964, art. VIII(1), 384 U.N.T.S. 169 (five ratifications); Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (1964),
opened for signature July 1, 1964, art. X(1), 384 U.N.T.S. 169 (five ratifications).
30

See, e.g, Convention on the InternationalSale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, art 99(1),

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 668 [hereinafter CISG] (ten ratifications). This comparatively large number is best understood in context. CISG is a comprehensive treaty, addressing contracting
generally, which is the very foundation of commercial law.
31 The classic examples of the non-relationship between required and actual
ratifications (i) in the Transactional Private Law Treaty context, is the CISG (ten
required and 58 actual ratifications (as of 8 March 2001)); (ii) in the transactional air law context, the Convention on the International Recognition of Rights
in Aircraft, June 19, 1948, 4 U.S.T. 1830, 310 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention] (two required and 85 actual ratifications (as of 8 March 2001,
UNTC)); and (iii) in the broader non-transactional private international treaty
law context, is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, entered into force June 7,
1959, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1959) [hereinafter Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention]
(three required and 148 actual ratifications (as of 27 May 1999, UNCITRAL online updated 8 March 2001 and U.N.T.S.)).
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E.

THE NEW INITIATIVE ARGUMENT

There is a commonly held view that treaties addressing new
topics, initiatives or thinking ought to enter into force more
quickly than ones requiring a transition from existing, well-established treaty systems. The basic notion is that there is a reinforcing relation between the growth of new-systems and their
acceptance. Having new-system treaties in force will contribute
to their development, which, in turn, will attract further ratifications, and so on.
The Convention/Protocol is a new-initiative treaty. There is
no significant body of existing international law dealing with advanced international secured financing and leasing practices.
While there are a few instruments touching on select aspects of
its subject matter,32 the basic concepts in the texts are sui generis,
and thus, would not be disruptive vis-a--vis extant law and
practice.33
F.

PARADIGMATIC ARGUMENT

That Transactional Private Law Treaties are modeled on, and
presuppose transactional paradigms, is tautological.
The paradigm for the Convention/Protocol is understood
through a simple hypothetical set of facts. Party 1, an airline
(P1) located in Si, wishes to lease aircraft engines from Party 2,
a leasing company (P2) located in S2. S2, in turn, funds its
purchase of the leased engines by borrowing from a bank (P3)
located in 83. For spice, let us further assume the following: P1
is a state-owned airline, and the only airline operating in Si, a
small island-nation heavily dependent upon tourism. P1 needs
aircraft engines to ensure safe, efficient travel to and from its
32 See Geneva Convention, supra note 31 (principally a conflict of laws convention (State X agrees to recognize proprietary rights in aircraft created in State Y,
the State where the aircraft in registered for nationality purposes under the Chicago Convention)); Financial Leasing Convention, supra note 28 (a convention
confined to three-party financial leasing, and not addressing, inter alia, priorities
or insolvency).
33 As regards law, the Convention contains provisions, which establish its relationship with the Geneva Convention and the Financial Leasing Convention. See
Protocol, supranote 2, at arts. XXII (Convention supercedes the Geneva Convention as relates to aircraft and aircraft objects (as defined in the former), with the
latter continuing to apply to rights and interest not "covered or affected" by the
Convention, a phase intended to be interpreted broadly), XXIV (Convention
supercedes the Financial Leasing Convention as regards aircraft objects). As regards practice, the Convention has been designed to reflect advance asset-based
financing and leasing practices employed in the aviation sector.

2001]

AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT

1413

balmy shores. However, Si currently does not have sufficiently
well developed and/or internationally recognized leasing and
accession laws. Thus, on grounds of excessive risk, P2, which
would otherwise lease the engines, will not. Nor will others. P2
happens to be the sole international financial institution in
neighboring S2 that wishes to establish itself as a banking enclave in this set of island nations.
While one can add to this paradigm, for example, by asserting
that P1 sub-leases the engine, or that P2 sells the engine to a
third party, such additions are not necessary to make the essential point.
That point is straightforward: assuming SI and S2 ratify the
Convention/Protocol (Ratifying Transactional States), why
should P1 and P2 (even P3) 34 not be able to enjoy the treaty's

benefits on account of non-ratification by S3 or (a fortiori) by
other states with no connection at all to the transaction? A conclusion that they should be so affected disregards the paradigm
underlying Transactional Private Law Treaties.
PART III: PROTRACTED ENTRY INTO FORCE: THE
ARGUMENTS AND RESPONSES
The main arguments to date in favor of protracted entry into
force provisions have been few and tentative. Notwithstanding
the bracketed current provisions in the Convention/Protocol
calling for three to five ratifications and the points made above,
three such arguments may be distilled. We find these arguments, first, unconvincing on their face, and, second, vastly outweighed from a policy perspective by the arguments made in
Part II above. Nonetheless, and with a view towards encouraging unified thinking at the diplomatic conference, we take up
and respond to these arguments.
A.

THE AIR LAW ARGUMENT

The first argument refers to a subset of existing air law treaties
requiring a significantly higher number of ratifications. It then
concludes that "air law" precedent and ICAO practice require a
higher number of ratifications.
34

The Convention/Protocol applies if a debtor is situated or an aircraft is reg-

istered in a Contracting State, regardless of where a creditor is legally located. See

Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 3-5 (Convention connecting factors); see also,
Protocol, supra note 2, at art. IV(1) (additional bases applicable to aircraft
equipment).
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This argument is vulnerable on two broad fronts. First, the
proffered treaties are of a fundamentally different type than the
Convention/Protocol. They are either public law treaties, such
as the Chicago Convention of 1944,15 or non-transactional treaties, such as those compromising the Warsaw system and the
modernizing and consolidating Montreal Convention. Unlike
the Convention/Protocol, the latter treaty also would fall into
the category of treaties modifying established international
systems.
Non-transactional private law treaties, in the instant case, air
liability treaties, address random events. The costs, if any, of
their entry into force delay, are allocated fairly, considered ex
ante. They are distributed among all states and airlines. The
foregoing sharply contrasts with the situation under the Convention/Protocol.
In sum, while a larger number of ratifications is justified in
the air liability setting, the financing context is completely different, even if both affect aviation.
Second, a careful survey of relevant air law actually supports a
low number of ratifications in the transactional context. The air
law treaty with the nearest relation is the Geneva Convention. It
3 7 The thinking
strikingly required but two ratifications.
associated with the 1948 Geneva Convention's small-number-of-required-ratifications approach reveals reasoning similar to that
contained in this article." The only other tangentially related
air law instrument, the Convention on the Unification of Cer-

35 The Chicago Convention established a basic framework, rules of decision,
and select standards for State action and interaction in the civil aviation. Its guiding principles are statist, to-wit, sovereignty, territoriality, and nationality. See Chicago Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 1 (States have complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace above their territory), 2 (defining territory), and 17
(aircraft have the nationality of the State in which it is registered). Private activity
as such is not addressed in that instrument.
36 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for InternationalCarriageby Air
(1999), done May 28, 1999, ICAO DCW Doc. No. 57, reprinted in 4 UNIFORM LAW
REVIEW 835, 948 (1999).
37 See Geneva Convention, supra note 31, at art. XX.
318 See Annotated Text of Convention on InternationalRecognition of Rights in Aircraft
- Preparedby the Legal Subcommittee of the Air CoordinatingCommittee, 16 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 70, 91 (1949) (noting the desirability of bringing the treaty into force "immediately" with respect to two States since they themselves can amply fulfil their
respective treaty obligations).
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tain Rules relating to the Precautionary Arrest of Aircraft, required five ratifications.39
B.

THE UNIVERSALISTIC ARGUMENT

The second argument is a bit more vague and rarely articulated with precision. If it were, it would go something like the
following. The Chicago Convention, a gem in the history of international lawmaking and institution-building, created ICAO.
That treaty was universalistic.40 It sought and achieved worldwide acceptance. In practice, ICAO carries that approach forward. 41 This general attitude has contributed to, and perhaps
produced, a large degree of uniformity in international civil aviation, a societal good. Thus, this universal approach should be
followed in the present case.
This argument, possibly pleasing in abstract terms, does not
stand scrutiny in this context. As a threshold matter, it imposes
a public law approach - which, in the particular context of aviation, carries universalistic overtones - on the private, transactional law subject matter of the Convention/Protocol. General
air safety, navigation, and security require worldwide thinking, if
not approaches. Aircraft financing simply does not.
The critique goes much deeper. The Convention/Protocol
self-consciously avoids excessive uniformity. It does so given, inter alia, the complexity of the subject matter, the national policies affected, and its relations with non-aviation law, often the
core commercial law in states. The Convention/Protocol is sensitive to the particular needs of individual states. States should
come into the system when they are ready and choose the option by which they agree to be bound.
39 Convention on the Unification of Certain Rules relatingto the PrecautionaryArrest of
Aircraft, at art. 11(2), ICAO Doc. 7620 (May 29, 1933).
40 Of relevance, that universality, now assumed, was not a necessaryfeature of the
Chicago Convention regime, which came into force after twenty-six ratifications.
See Chicago Convention, supra note 4, at art. 91(b). Two inferences may be
drawn supporting points made elsewhere in this article. First, the Chicago Convention itself, when adopted, had attributes of a "new initiative" instrument, en-

couraging early activation as a means, inter alia, of attracting support and
ratifications, thereby reinforcing the system. Second, the Chicago Convention
experience also supports the assertion that there is no necessary relation between
required and actual treaty ratifications.
41 In part, by virtue of the requirement contained in that instrument that at
least two-thirds of its Contracting State ratify any proposed amendment thereto.
See id. at art. 94(a).
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If anything is left of this argument, it is vastly outweighed by
the economic, fairness, and safety arguments made in Part II.
A universalistic approach to the Convention/Protocol is transparently inconsistent with the general thinking underlying the
development of the Convention/Protocol.
C.

THE INSTITUTION-CREATION ARGUMENT

The final argument focuses on the fact that the Convention/
Protocol will create an International Registry, proposing regulation by a supervisory authority. Reduced to its essence, the argument is that precedent for and practicalities of "institutioncreating" treaties justify slower or more complex entry into force
arrangements. This argument is the easiest to refute.
Both the "precedent" and the "practicality" argument reflect a
misunderstanding of the function, nature, and technological
features of the contemplated International Registry. It will not
be a traditional, civil aviation style, documentary, manual registry.4 2 It will be a wholly electronic "notice-based" registry
system.4 3
The system will be "next generation" - conceptually - but will

employ essentially, off-the-shelf technology. As contemplated, it
will be inexpensive to create, use, or maintain. Its sole function
will be to electronically register notices of interests, thereby providing objective criteria for the Convention/Protocol's first-intime ranking of claims rule. The core responsibility of the supervisory authority will be to ensure that this electronic system
works efficiently and fairly."
Plainly, neither the International Registry nor ICAO as a candidate for the supervisory function would create an institution
comparable to, for example, PICAO, GATT, Intelsat, and the
International Criminal Court. The arrangements creating these
42 See Report of the InternationalRegistiy Task Force, at Attachment I, ICAO Doc. CWP/1 1505 (162nd Session, Reference Material: Second Report of the International
Registy Task Force and attachments) (Basic Features of the proposed International

Registry contemplated by the Convention as modified by the Aircraft Equipment
Protocol) [hereinafter IRTF Registry Summary]. See id. at 1 1(3) (registry will
serve the sole function of establishing priorities among competing, valid claims),
1(5) (registry will be a minimalist, notice-based system, in which documents may
not be registered), and 1(6) (registrar's role will be administrative, not
interventionist).
43 See id. at 1 1(2) (registrations and searches will be made solely by electronic
means).
44 See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also IRTF Registry Summary,
supra note 42, at I(7) and II(11).
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bona fide institutions contained in their enabling international
instruments were understandably complex. Analogies between
the creation of a simple electronic system and these complex
and highly staffed institutions are clearly inapposite.
The only impediments to a prompt and rapid development of
the International Registry are political: who will operate it and
from where.45
In view of the points favoring prompt entry into force as set
out in Part II, it is incumbent upon all interested parties to ensure that the creation of the International Registry is not used as
a pacing item, justifying delay. That would be a distortion, indeed, a transmutation, of the International Registry. An electronic system, requiring proper design, professional support,
and appropriate oversight, is not an elaborate new institution?
PART IV: REALISTIC ENTRY INTO FORCE SCENARIOS
Based on the foregoing, we believe there are only two options
for entry into force worthy of serious consideration. The first is
much preferred: a small number of required ratifications coupled with advance development of the International Registry.
The second is complex: provisional application.
A.

SMALL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS WITH ADVANCE
REGISTRY DEVELOPMENT

The most appropriate course of action would be for the diplomatic conference to endorse the current text. The effect would
be to require a small number of required ratifications, between
three and five, to bring the Convention/Protocol into force.
Coupled with the meaningful advance development of the electronic International Registry and robust ratification efforts, that
approach could have the instrument in force within a year of
the conference, that is, late 2002.46
45 While a "request for proposals" from those States wishing to host the registry
will soon be to States on an informal basis by the ICAO, that organization has
elected not to require formal responses thereto prior to the diplomatic conference. At the time of this writing, UNIDROIT's approach to the matter has not
yet been announced. For the practical importance of prompt development of
the physical registry, see infra Parts IV A and B.
46 Entry into force one year following adoption is a realistic target, which has
been achieved, in circumstances less compelling than those that apply to the present case. See Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention, supra note 31 (adopted June
10, 1958 and entered into force on June 7, 1959).
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Such an approach would produce the maximum economic
and safety-enhancement benefits, and would minimize the horizon inequity problem.
Significant conceptual work has already been done on the International Registry, principally by a special Ad Hoc Task Force.47
That group has been reporting to UNIDROIT and ICAO. Based
on the texts, it has developed and articulated the technical requirements of the International Registry, addressed a range of
legal items' 8 and prepared in-process a working draft of regulations. It has also proposed substantive and procedural elements
on the registrar-selection process.
What has not been done, however, is work on the physicality
of the International Registry. This work is now a high priority.
Developmental work - prototypes and testing - should be under-

taken during the period prior to the conference to avoid unnecessary delay thereafter.
B.

PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

Absent the above approach, it will be necessary for the conference to explore the rich topic of provisional application (and
use of other treaty mechanisms) as a means of ensuring the
early realization of benefits. Provisional application is a realistic
yet complex option. It should be responsibly considered at this
stage.
A few threshold points are of note. It is misleading to speak
of "provisional entry into force." The Vienna Treaty Convention
contemplates the provisional applicationof a treaty prior to entry
into force.49 The concept, employed rarely at the time of Vienna, has since become more common. The reasons for this
include the need to apply modern treaties sooner rather than
47 That group, chaired by France and the United States, was created during
the intergovernmental negotiating process. It has been instructed to continue its
preparatory work for use at the diplomatic conference. Its work to date has recently been summarized and reported. See IRTF Registry Summary, supranote 42
(reference material and attachments).
48 Including, (i) the legal relationship between the supervisory authority and
the registrar, (ii) questions of immunities, (iii) ownership of the International
Registry, its software and data, and (iv) liability for financial loss based on error,

design problems and force majeure events. See id.

49Where a treaty has a provisional application clause, the obligation arises by
virtue of a State's participation in the adoption of that treaty. Absent such a
clause, the obligation typically stems from a State's supporting vote for a conference resolution endorsing provisional application. See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 139 (Cambridge University Press 2001).
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later and the experience of ratification difficulties. 50 The Chicago Convention itself contained aspects of provisional
application.5"
Provisional application is a flexible and elastic concept. It has
taken, and in the subject case, may take many possible forms.
There is leading precedent for presumptive provisional application, basically implied consent to provisional application, with
an opt-out.5 2 There is also leading precedent for quite longterm "provisional" arrangements.53
It must be immediately noted, however, that there are four
material disadvantages in pursuing provisional application in
this case. We believe that these disadvantages counsel use of
provisional application only as a last resort. First, the concept is
complex. The Convention/Protocol are intricate instruments,
some think too intricate. Another legal doctrine layered on its
top might be unacceptably heavy to states. Second, many states
need legislative or parliamentary consent to provisional application, thus significantly reducing its advantage.54
Third, and potentially troubling in practice, the details of any
provisional application arrangement may require creative problem-solving in order to avoid limiting the intended treaty benefits. By way of example, provisional application might be
employed to by-pass the need to wait for the creation of the International Registry. This case - the most likely (but avoidable)
scenario - would require alternative rules for perfection of international interests in both airframe and aircraft engines. The
foregoing underscores the need to advance rapidly with the
physical development of the International Registry, including
potential use under a provisional application arrangement.
50
51

See id. See also Lefeber, supra note 9, at 82.
See generally Interim Agreement on InternationalCivil Aviation, at 59-86, ICAO

Doc. 7300/7 (Dec. 7, 1944) (establishing, inter alia, the Provisional International
Civil Aviation Organization, and making interim arrangements for its governance
and financing).
52 See United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL
MATERAUS 1261 (1982) (stating that if the instrument did not enter into force by
a specified date - which it did not - the same would be applied provisionally by
signatory States not notifying the depositary otherwise (17 of 79 signatories so
opted out)).
53 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 was applied provisionally for several decades through a Protocol of Provisional Application. 55
U.N.T.S. 171 (no. 814 ((b)) and 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (No. 8141 (c)).
54

See Lefeber, supra note 9, at 89 - 90.
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Fourth, unless states (accepting such provisional application)
as a group otherwise agree, 55 the relative ease with which a particular state may disassociate itself from the provisional arrangement 56 is in tension with the predictability objectives of the
Convention/Protocol. This problem can be mitigated, however,
by protecting vested interests at the time of any such disassociation. That approach would find parallels in the Convention/
Protocol proper.5 7
Failing technical provisional application, other types of implementing treaty-based agreements are possible.
CONCLUSION
Work on the Convention/Protocol has spanned a significant
number of years, and now these painstakingly drafted, leading
texts are ripe for adoption at the upcoming diplomatic Conference scheduled for October 29th to November 16th of this year
in Cape Town.
However, adoption of these new international legal instruments will only serve the pressing needs of states and the air
transport sector if the entry into force provisions of the Convention/Protocol contemplate - and facilitate - the prompt activa-

tion of the treaty.
Requiring a small number of ratifications, such as three to five
as currently in the texts, is fully consistent with the proper classification of the Convention/Protocol. It is a Transactional Private Law Treaty affecting aviation. This approach would be in
line with modern trends in this important field of international
law making. It would permit entry into force timing comparable
with best international practices.
Coupled with advance work on physical development of the
International Registry, this minimum required ratification standard would help maximize the economic and other benefits of
the Convention/Protocol. Finally, it would not be prejudicial to
the interests of states whose airlines anticipate taking aircraft deliveries in the near term.
55 Which they are permitted and may do. SeeVienna Treaty Convention, supra
note 6, at art. 25 (2).
56 See id.
57 See Protocol, supra note 2, at arts. XXIX (subsequent declaration does not

affect "rights and interests arising prior to the effective date of that subsequent
declaration") and XXXI (denunciation does not affect "rights and interests arising prior to the effective date of that denunciation").

